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Law And Disorder
ROBERT W. GoRnoN*

My object of interest here is the law of free expression, viewed from an
oblique angle. The classic free speech article glosses a big pile of cases to
see how well they express a particular theory of freedom, normally the
glossator's own theory, and to rebuke the courts for not expressing that
theory better than they do. But in addition to ideas of freedom, naturally,
free speech law expresses ideas of order and disorder: of what constitutes
good order and what threatens it. The idea of exploring images of order
and disorder in the law came to me as I was engaged last year in trying to
teach law students at Oxford a course comparing the British and American
law of speech and press. Impressed from the first with how relatively
authoritarian in many respects British law seems to be compared to the
American, I was moved as others have been' to try to pin down the
differences in basic attitudes towards order and order-maintenance that seem
to lie behind these legal differences. If the exploration holds any interest
for American lawyers, it might do so in part because the ways in which
British public law differ from American are by no means strange or novel
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. This essay is a somewhat expanded and revised

version of the Addison Harris Lecture given at the Indiana University School of Law, at
Bloomington, in April, 1988. I am very grateful to Dean Bryant Garth and his faculty for
their invitation and generous hospitality, and to Stephen Conrad and Donald Gjerdingen for
companionship and critical comments during my stay. Other occasions for talking out some
of these ideas were provided by David Sugarman and the Middlesex Polytechnic Faculty of
Law in March, 1988, and by Dean William Neilson and his colleagues of the University of
Victoria Faculty of Law, especially John McLaren and Andrew Petter, during a stay at Victoria

as a Lansdowne Visitor in October.
1. See, e.g., I. BROWNMIE & M. SPuERsToNE, BRowNIIE's LAW OF PuaIC ORDER AND
NAToNAL SEcuRar (2d ed. 1981); Barnum, The Constitutional Status of Public Protest
Activity in Britain and the United States, 1977 PuB. L. 310. E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEE CH

(1985) is now the indispensable guide to comparative U.S.-U.K. free speech law.
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to an American ear, but actually are entirely familiar, representing as they
do a sometimes muted but ever-present conservative alter ego in AngloAmerican legal culture, one that has been dominant at various points in
our country's experience, that appears piecemeal in our public-order doctrine
still, and even now has powerful people speaking for its revival and
expansion. For even within the liberal capitalist democracies, there has
rarely been anything like consensus on what good order demands. There
have, rather, been conflicting ideologies of order, some of which have come
to predominate at different times at the expense of the others, without ever
completely displacing their rivals.
The main opposing ideological camps are ones we could characterize as
conservative and revisionary, or Tory and Radical, Federalist and Jeffersonian, classic and romantic, authoritarian-hierarchical (or top-down) and
participatory-democratic (or bottom-up) visions of social order-or to simplify matters, just Blue and Red. I will begin by giving a brief account of
each of these common ideologies of order, then match each type with some
specific British and American examples. This essay's next and (I hope)
slightly more interesting and novel move will be to question sharply the
utility of this conventional typology. Though I am fairly confident that my
types (or at least the "conservative" type-the "revisionary's" historical
actuality is more problematic2 ) describe real social attitudes that many real
groups have held and continue to hold, and that these general predispositions
have a real influence upon political responses to claims of free expression,
I also believe they are very distorting ideologies. As lenses through which
to view either Anglo-American differences or the motivations behind the
most important social and political conflicts over freedom and order in the
last century, the ideologies obscure as much as they clarify. The ultimate
aim of the exercise is simply to show that some of the most common
ideologies of order are often quite ill-suited both to the enterprise of social
understanding and to the modes of social life their proponents would like
to promote in the world. I guess I should give fair advance warning that
this is a set of reflections. There will be no sharply pointed moral or
message at the end of it and certainly no proposals for doctrinal or legislative
change.
Let me start by outlining the typologies conventionally opposed to one
another, the Red and Blue visions as they hae comfie to be articulated in
political debate, intellectual argument, and legal doctrine concerning free
expression. 3 Both Red and Blue in this scheme are positions taken by

2. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
3. Obviously there are many other ways besides these two in which one might classify
ideologies of order, including much richer schemes than this relatively crude dichotomy. A
critic might fairly complain: "When you've set up a dichotomy as crude as yours, you should
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disputants claiming to share a commitment to the ideals of Free Speech,
the Rule of Law and Democratic Government. 4 In most important ways
they obviously more closely resemble one another than they do ideas of
order in societies whose ruling groups make no such claims. Yet it is
remarkable in fact how diverse the basic conceptions of good social order
can be among parties who all subscribe to liberal-democratic values. The
elements of each vision sum to a conception of order that is fairly coherent.
Not that you would expect everyone who adopted one or two pieces of
each world view to accept all the other pieces, but you would not be at all
surprised if most did because there are strong elective affinities among the
components. What follows is a discussion of the most basic elements of
each view as I see them.
The conservative vision assumes that there is an existing stable framework,
a traditional or established framework of institutions, political, cultural and
economic, which it is public law's primary purpose to reinforce and to
protect against disruption of its normal functioning. The conservative's
motto might be: "Politics only in the right places, politics channeled and
confined." It distinguishes sharply between the public realm, where political
action is appropriate, and the market and private realms where it is not.
Even in the public realm, the formally constituted authorities-parliamentary
representatives and ministers of the executive-possess a near monopoly
over political activity: They set the agenda of policy options, decide what
is in the public interest and how much information about their activities
may be disclosed or kept secret. Popular participation is limited to voting
or activities surrounding voting and to regular modes of petitioning or
lobbying public officers for changes in or exemptions from the rules. Outside
these authorized channels and occasions, politics is inappropriate and indeed
disruptive of the real business of life, which in the economic sphere is
commerce-production and marketing of goods and services-and in the
private sihere is consumption and family life. Indeed, there is a basic core
of established ground rules that govern economic and private conduct,
allocating authority over social decisionmaking and defining spheres of

not be surprised that it breaks down when applied to actual historical practices." But my
claim here, the validity of which the reader will have of course to judge for herself, is that,
crude as they are, these categories are fairly serviceable as accounts of general ideological
attitudes, that they do describe with reasonable accuracy general ways of thinking about order
and disorder that are prevalent in Anglo-American culture. The point at which the categories
fall apart as tools of analysis is when one switches from the level of general dispositions
towards order and order-maintenance, to specific historical instances of the regulation of
spebch, crowds, associations or sexuality.
4. Blues are thus not royalists or fascists, but rather something like nineteenth century
classical "liberals" in political economy and traditionalists in cultural matters, or modern
Thatcherite or Reaganite free-market-law-and-order "neo-conservatives." Reds are not Communists, but closer to the "radical republicans" of the nineteenth century and the "socialdemocrats" and "democratic socialists" and "cultural radicals" of the present.
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decisional autonomy-private property, free contract, management control
over business decisions, monogamous marriage, etc.-which is to be immune
altogether from substantial political revision, amenable only to peripheral
and incremental tinkering. Proposals for substantial revision-let us imagine,
for schemes prescribing a large workers' share in enterprise management,
or authorizing homosexual marriage-may be tolerated, if at all, only so
long as they remain academic, speculative, culturally marginal and politically
innocuous; they must never be allowed to reach the agenda of serious
legislative action, and if by chance they do, they must be suppressed.
A public order so conceived depends essentially upon maintaining respect
for authority-in magistrates, employers, cultural authorities such as teachers and clerics-and upon personal virtue understood as self-restraint in the
interests of civic community and moral stability. As such it is a fragile
order. Its proponents tend to be risk-averse, believing authority to be easily
vulnerable to sedition and virtue to seduction and corruption; people,
especially the masses, are weak and irrational, easily victimized by demagogues and temptations to self-indulgence. The acceptable political discourse
of such a civic culture is thus polite and rationalistic (though there is of
course also a populist strain of conservatism that glorifies the common
sense of common people against the speculative theorizing of fancy intellectuals).
The conservative order comes equipped with a distinctive legal regime of
order-maintenance. One of its distinctive qualities is that of faith in the
efficacy of the legal regime, especially the criminal law, as a device for
shoring up the culture of virtue. Although some conservatives lay special
stress upon the merits of the repressive criminal sanction as a form of
behavior control, and others on the educational influence of legislation and
court decisions as a source of guiding norms, most seem to believe that one
way or other law is causally efficacious as a producer of order. More
specifically, the conservative society's public-order law expresses in manifold
ways both the fear of subversion and anarchy-any street assembly is a
potential mob; any socialist discussion society is a potential conspiracyand the abiding suspicion of extra-parliamentary politics, especially street
politics, as abnormal disruptions of the ordinary business of market and
private life, the flow of production, the streams of commerce and consumption, and as rivals to the sovereignty of established authorities.
The legal doctrines are concerned to give the authorities a large discretion
to keep such inappropriate political manifestations under control. Legal
definitions of harm are in terms of dangerous intentions and motives, not
just acts, and of long-run and speculative bad tendencies to social damage,
not just imminent and likely consequences. Instead of having to wait for
provable harms, the authorities are legally empowered to take preventive
steps-keep files on subversives, prevent their employment in positions of
trust, search their houses for subversive material, intercept their mail and
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phone lines, place obstacles in the way of their collective organization and
funding, and proscribe or set strict limiting conditions on their processions
or assemblies. If demonstrators are allowed out on the street, the police
will again have a wide discretion to deflect threats to order, such threats
again broadly defined as anything that causes or that-in the suppositions
of the police-might possibly cause damage, disruption, delay, or even just
distress to other people on the street. The street speaker will be held strictly
liable for the responses of his audience, who are not treated as possessing
independent rational will, but as emotional puppets who will blindly obey
the agitator if he incites them, or respond with blind violence if he insults
them. To keep political discourse genteel and respectful of authority, a strict
libel law will protect public figures from untrue, rude or personal assaults
on their record and character.
The law of intermediate associations, especially labor unions, will be
directed to ensuring that associations subserve (or at least refrain from
competing with) rather than challenge officially defined purposes. Labor
law, in particular, is directed to confining the role of unions to fragmented
and decentralized bread-and-butter bargaining in individual workplaces,
where they can be valuable allies in procuring industrial stability; and to
prevent industrial action that challenges the basic prerogatives of employer
management, especially "political" action beyond one's own employment,
in the form of secondary or sympathy strikes or pickets; and above all to
prevent one of the most threatening kinds of extra-parliamentary politics,
the explicitly political strike.
The conservative order has, of course, a moral, cultural and sexual
constitution to match its political-economic constitution. It uses traditional
socializing agencies such as schools and churches to promote values of
family, cooperation, patriotism, and respect for authority. It promotes a
uniform culture, perhaps by means of a prescribed national curriculum of
canonical texts. It makes criminal offenses out of desecration or mockery
of the sacred symbols of cultural unity, as for example with blasphemy or
flag-burning laws. Sexual deviance-passion, like politics, in the wrong
places-is seen as a social threat. Casual and extramarital sex threatens
family life, which is the moral basis of society as the stable environment
for child rearing and moral education; more globally, sexual hedonism
subverts the Spartan virtue of self-discipline needed for investment, production, and military preparedness. The criminal sanction is widely deployed
against all potential encouragements to sex outside heterosexual-marriagefor-the-sake-of-procreation: against adultery, homosexuality, non-genital sex,
erotic and pornographic representations, and any promotion of the sale,
use of, or advice in the techniques of birth control.
The Blue vision thus links together many miscellaneous signs of disordercrime, riot, laziness, welfare-chiseling, slacking off at work, organizing and
striking to get something for nothing, redistribution through progressive
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taxation and social benefits, divorce, promiscuity, pornography, homosexuality, contraception, abortion on demand-into a general culture of licentiousness, which is the antithesis of the culture of order, virtue, and authority
that conservatives believe is both promoted by, and is required to sustain,
a free-market economy. In the words of Norman Tebbit, a prominent
former Thatcher government minister:
Society today is more violent and corrupt than it was . ... The trigger
of today's outburst of crime and violence . . . lies in the era and
attitudes of post-war funk which gave birth to the "permissive society"
which in turn generated today's violent society . . . . Permissiveness
compounded by the economic failure and personal irresponsibility engendered by the socialist state leads inevitably to the violent society.5

Critics of the Blue vision, perhaps especially those of a libertarian cast of
mind, have commented upon what seem to be some peculiar disparities in
6
the conservative approaches to the economic, political and private spheres.

When their eye is on the market and its Economic Men and Women,
conservatives see robust autonomous actors capable of rational choice and
view legal restrictions on such choices as not only misguided, but, given
costs and complexities of enforcement, substitution effects and evasions,
likely to be ineffectual and counterproductive: They praise economic "liberty" and scorn "regulation." This contrasts strikingly with the conservative

picture of Political Men and Women as impressionable simpletons easily
swayed from their true interests and whipped into frenzied mob action by
radical demagogues and contrasts still more with the picture of people in
private life as fatally prone to depravity and corruption, unless guided by

compulsory training in morals and citizenship and restrained by a rigid

5. Disraeli Lecture for 1985, reported in The Times (London), Nov. 14, 1985, at 2, col.
1, quoted in Dunning, Murphy, Newburn & Waddington, Violent Disorders in Twentieth
Century Britain, in THE CRowD IN CONTEMPORARY BirrAn 19 (G. Gaskell & R. Benewick
eds. 1987). Examples of this sort of rhetoric in present day conservative writing are of course
abundant. For some American specimens in the work of prominent neo-conservative academics,
see J. BucHANAN & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY n DEFiCIT 64-65 (1977); M. DECTER, Tan NEw
CaAsTriY ANm OTHER ARGUMENTs AoAiNST WOMEN's LIBERATION (1972); J. WILSON & R.
HERRNsTEN, CRME AND HutmAN NATURE (1985). The counterpart rhetoric of a century ago
was the linking of political and erotic deviance in the association of "anarchy" with "free
love" as companion radical threats to order. See generally H. SEARS, TaE SEx RADICAiS: FREE
LovE
HIGH VICTORIAN AMERICA (1977); T. STOEHR, FREE LovE IN AMERICA: A DoCUMENTrARY
HISTORY (1979).
6. See, e.g., S. BRrTAN, CAPrrALISM AND Tan PERumSSmv SocmTY (1973). The work of
Brittan, a British economist who has influenced the Thatcher government's economic policies,
exemplifies a way of thinking that will presumably become common in post-1980's political
discourse. One might call it a Yuppie credo combining free-market and free-choice-of-lifestyle
ideologies in a general celebration of permissiveness. Brittan declares his solidarity with the
1960's rebels-with their sense of alienation from not being in control of their own destiny,
their contempt for bureaucratic authority, their revolt against repressive morals regulation,
their yearning for expressive spontaneity-and then argues that by far the best way to realize
1960's values is through entrepreneurial capitalism.
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sexual code fully backed up by the criminal sanction. 7 But on a closer look
many of these disparities disappear: Some intelligent conservatives have long
hypothesized that the "free market," at least their kind of free market,
requires a rigid political and moral constitution, that is, an institutional and
procedural framework of rights and obligations maintained by legal compulsion and to some extent immunized against revision through normal
politics, as well as an underpinning of socializing arrangements that will
produce the social character-types that models of economic rationality are
content to assume.8 The liberal citizen, active when he is called upon to
vote but otherwise quiescent and law-abiding; the capitalist entrepreneur,
who saves and invests rather than blowing everything on immediate consumption; the industrial laborer, schooled to work-disciplines; and the
middle-manager, schooled to bureaucratic team-play and hierarchy are, as
we are reminded both by the Victorian tracts on political economy and
morals, 9 and the newer literatures on the history of "disciplines," 10 all social
characters that have to be elaborately manufactured-by systems of legal
compulsion as well as other cultural means. As Jiirgen Habermas has put
it in his own trenchant account of the elements of neo-conservative ideology:
[To the neo-conservative the] modem world appears as the world of
technical progress and capitalist growth; all social dynamic, which is
ultimately based on private investments, is modern and desirable; the
motivational resources on which this dynamic thrives are in need of
protection. Danger lies in cultural transformations, motivational and
attitudinal changes, and shifts in patterns of values or identities, which
are attributed to the entry of cultural innovations into more or less
traditional forms of life. Therefore the legacy of tradition has to be
preserved as far as possible."

7. There is an excellent (though slightly different from this one) discussion of how
classical-liberal discourse sets up contradictory models of human action, seeing people as
independent "choosers" for some purposes and dependent "learners" for others in S. Bow.Es
& H. GINms, DEMocRAcY AND CAPIrrALis 121-27 (1986). I thank John Gardner of All Souls
College, Oxford for pointing out the relevance of this passage to free expression law.
8. The classical political economists all assumed such an infrastructure of moral disciplines.
See L. ROBBINS, THE THEORY OF ECONOIC POLICY INENGLISH CLASSICAL POLITICAL EcoNoMY
(1965); W. SAMUELs, THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ECONOIEC POLCY (1950). For modem theories
of the moral underpinnings necessary to sustain the institutions of capitalism (not particularly
conservative in their conclusions), see D. BELL, TH CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALIsm
(1976); F. HmSCH, THE SOCIAL LmIrS TO GROWTH (1976); J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALnSM,
SOcIALIsM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
9. See, e.g., M. FAWCETT, POITICAL EcONoMY FOp. BEGINNERS (4th ed. 1876); H. MARTINEAU, ILLUSTRATIONS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1834); S. Simias, Soxr-HELP (1859).
10. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCILINE AND PUNISH (1977); M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF
PAIN: Tan PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1850 (1978); D. ROTHMAN,
THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971).
11. Habermas, Neoconservative Culture Criticism in the United States and West Germany:
An Intellectual Movement in Two PoliticalCultures, in HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 78, 87 (R.
Bernstein ed. 1988).
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What remains somewhat puzzling, to me anyway, is why so many conservatives manage to believe, as apparently they do, that the legal regulation
of market activity is usually doomed to failure while compulsion in the
spheres of politics and morals-death penalties and long sentences for
criminal offenders, criminalizing abortions, pornography and flag-burning,
legally mandated prayers and pledges of allegiance among schoolchildren12

are still expected to be effective producers of virtue.
The conservative's nightmare images of communal disorder are of course
point for point the images of the countervision, the revisionary, or radicalrepublican images of order as continuous flux. This ideology is considerably
harder to describe. Its adherents' very commitment to fluidity in social life
makes it hard for them to fill in the content of their ideal order very
concretely. 3 In any case, radical visionaries have notoriously found it much
harder to unite on a common program than have conservatives. Very likely
many of the movements that have proclaimed revisionary ideals have done
so only half-heartedly and tactically, secretly believing that things would go
best if their sect's or party's program were permanently entrenched, but
publicly committed by necessity of their minority position to the norms of
pluralism, free debate, and open political and cultural possibilities. The
biggest difficulty is that while we are all familiar with periods and regimes
that have tried in various ways to put the Blue idea into practice, we have
seen the Red one in action only in fragmentary and fleeting moments,
confined to relatively short periods or small areas of social life.
4
The slogans of a revisionary society might be "politics everywhere,"'1
and "passion everywhere" as well. The aim of politics is not to confirm a

12. Not all conservatives, clearly, believe in the effectiveness of criminal sanctions, but
even those who do not sometimes argue for retaining such sanctions as symbolic proclamations
of what conduct society approves and disapproves, accepts as normal and stigmatizes as
deviant. See, e.g., P. DEvLN, Tm ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
13. By far the most ambitious effort at a detailed description of what a revisionary order
might look like is R. UNOER, FALSE NECEssITy: ANT-NcEssrrARN SOCIAL. THEORY IN THE
SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
14. Bernard Crick expresses something very much like my contrast between Blue and Red
visions as follows:
Authoritarianism identifies liberty with some chosen and obligatory version of
truth or righteousness; but the republican tradition identifies liberty with the
positive exercise of citizenship, popular participation, the perpetual challenging
of authority, the election of leaders but always criticizing them and holding them
to account. The republican tradition aggressively seeks to politicize issues and to
democratize institutions; the liberal tradition gently seeks to take issues out of
politics and to put a wall of law between a legislature and, say, education,
religious observance, or property rights. To the republican while a good life
cannot be wholly political, yet nothing can be taken out of politics a priori; but
everything must be settled politically-that is, by public debate, argument, persuasion, bargaining, and compromise.
Crick, Politics, Socialism and Civil Liberties, in Crva LIBERTIEs IN CONFLICT 102, 109 (L.
Gostin ed. 1988).
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traditional political-cultural framework understood to be the unvarying
natural framework of society, but to keep the framework constantly open
to innovation and alteration, or to use John Dewey's more modest term,
to continual "experiment." There is no sharp split among public, economic
and private spheres: Every arena of social life, the family, the workplace,
religious associations, is a potential theatre of revisionary politics. Intermediate institutions and sometimes even spontaneously formed groups outside the regular government and parliamentary parties have a recognized,
maybe even sometimes legally recognized, role in governance. Trade associations and labor unions may, for instance, be represented on corporatist
planning committees, or have a statutory right to be consulted on economic
policy; the press may be given legal privileges to perform what Vince Blasi
calls its "checking function" as a counterweight to government, such as
legal rights of access to official information, or immunity from publishing
unauthorized disclosures or revealing sources.' 5 Street politics are a normal;
expected, and to some extent legally privileged mode of use of public spaces,
an accepted extra-parliamentary mode not only of venting grievances or
petitioning for change, but-in the radical-Whig-derived versions of the
ideology-among the legal remedies granted to "the People out of doors,"
entitled to use self-help and civil disobedience to local magistrates in order
to nullify and correct corrupt or unconstitutional governmental acts.' 6 Legal
definitions of sedition, riot, unlawful assembly, breach of the peace and
the like, reflect a broad indulgence towards street politics, yielding liberal
access to public fora and police protection of demonstrators, giving authorities little discretion to use preventive powers, punishing only immediate
tangible threats of violence rather than bad tendencies, holding responsible
those who act on an agitator's incitements or insults rather than the agitator
herself, and so forth. Legal concepts of libel authorize a politics that can
be abrasive, mocking, disrespectful, satirical, and even scatological.
As with politics, so with culture and sexuality. The legal regime is generally
one of hands-off, encouraging or at least tolerating plural cultures of the
sacred and valuable and plural cultures of sexual practices and representations and kinship and child-rearing arrangements, including those of an
open and polymorphous hedonism.' 7 In some arenas, however, revisionary
law may go beyond pluralist tolerance to prescribe forms of group life that
are sufficiently egalitarian, democratic, and flexible to forestall the hardening

15. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND. REs. J.
521. See also Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U. MumA
L. RPv. 819 (1980).
16. See P. MAmR, FRom RESISTANCE TO REVOLUnON 3-48 (1972); King, Letter from
Birmingham Jail, in M. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAT 76, 82-86 (1963).
17. Post, CulturalHeterogeneity and Law: Pornography,Blasphemy, and the FirstAmendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1988) is a particularly valuable contrast of orthodox and pluralist
cultures of legal regulation.
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of hierarchies within groups, as by specifying certain basic rights or constitutional forms for members of families, unions, universities, clubs or
coporations. It may promote conditions of open discourse by preventing
concentrated ownership of communications media, or requiring access to
such media for diverse viewpoints, or by subsidizing access (e.g., by secondclass mailing rates) for new entrants. It may try to deter-though both the
effectiveness of such regulation and its consistency with the Red commitment
to openness have been much disputed 1s-extreme forms of inter-group
intolerance, by means of statutes authorizing prosecutions or tort actions
against group libel or incitement to racial or religious hatred.
Even in the revisionary ideology, of course, there must be an implicit
core vision of some minimal constitutive elements of order that are not
subject to revision, of limits beyond which potentially effective political
agitation must not be allowed to go, lest it inaugurate a new order that is
not itself revisable. 19 Fascist, military, or racial-supremacist takeovers, violent revolutions that abolish democratic procedures in the name of the
yanguard's superior insight into the laws of history, are beyond the limits,
and serious threats to institute them must be put down by persuasion if
possible, by force if necessary. A Red who took a strict view of the
rinimum requirements of continually revisablp order, or an apprehensive
view of threats to that order, might well at some moments seem almost
indistinguishable from a Blue, as for instance some strenuously anti-Stalinist
social-democrats became in their reaction to the domestic Communist threat
in the 1950's. But a true Red can never be a true Blue because the essence
pf the Blue's position is that the framework of ideal liberal order is already
known and achieved, so that any attempt at basic revision is defined as a
threat; whereas, the Red is committed to opening social forms to continual
9xperiment and innovation. The visions are also identifiable by the types of
disruption they are willing to call a threat to the constitutive conditions of
order. Although both agree that the law should repress only action, not
mere expression that proposes to endanger order, conservatives perceive
much closer causal connections between expression and action (as well as
many more sources of danger), and so believe in a policy of killing off
serpents in their eggs. 20

18. British law has made "incitement to racial hatred" a criminal offense since 1968. Race
Relations Act, 1968, § 12, ch. 71; Race Relations Act, 1976, § 74. The British experience with
this offense has not been altogether encouraging. Once the statute is on the books, authorities
who passively fail to prosecute under it are accused of indifference to racialist poison. If
however they do prosecute anyone, they are accused of biased and selective prosecution. It is
not clear that the resulting controversies over the use or non-use of the law do much to
promote racial tolerance. See Leopold, Incitement to Racial Hatred, 1977 PuB. L. 389.
19. See Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment,
55 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 293 (1981).
20. For a classic instance of the preventive-action theory, here used to argue that a speech
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Now what strikes anyone given the job of looking comparatively at U.S.
and British law relating to free speech, certainly as a first impression,

(though j am going to argue in a moment that it is in some ways a quite
superficial first impression) is that, although neither society purely exemplifies Red or Blue types, the British law tends to fall to the conservative
side of the Great Dichotomous Divide here proposed, 21 and American law
somewhat to the revisionary side. Examples are easy to find but would take

so long to elaborate that I will give only a few, taking them chiefly from
the British law that is presumably less familiar to most readers. 22
The most striking contrasts are in the areas of political speech and public
forum law, where under the British common law and statutory regimes
freedom of speech is entirely residual, that is, legal only unless forbidden.
Statutes and case law grant officials a vast discretion to forbid. Although
the values of free speech and assembly are frequently affirmed in general
political (4nd sometimes legal) rhetoric, 23 and this affirmance has had a
provable braking effect on certain proposals for repressive legislation, 24 free
speech and assembly have no recognized legal status as general "rights"
subject tO restriction only for serious cause. At best they are only factors
of unspecified weight to be "balanced" in law-application against other

generally advocating violent action may be suppressed, even though there is little likelihood
that that particular speech will induce anyone to imminent action, see Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925):
That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful
meqns, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment
within the range of legislative discretion, is clear. Such utterances, by their very
nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They
threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger
is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance
cannot be accurately forqeqen. The State cannot reasonably be requiied to measure
the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A
single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may
burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the
State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of its judgment
as to thp measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to
extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed
into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of
measures for its own peace and pafety until the revolutionary utterances lead to
actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its
own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the
threatened danger in its incipiency.
21. This remains so after one excludes from consideration, as I have done throughout this
essay, the emergency measures Parliament has enacted for Northern Ireland.
22, Convenient summaries of the relevant British law are available in E. BARENDT, supra
note 1; I. BRowrmiE & M. STrPPERsToNE, supra note 1; Galligan, Preserving Public Protest:
The Legal Approach, ins CrvI. Lmmrms IN CoNLIcr 39 (L. Gostin ed. 1988).
23. See Boyle, Freedom of Expression as a Public Interest in English Law, 1982 PuB. L.
574.
24. One of the most dramatic instances was in the debates over public order legislation in
the 1930's. See R. BEnmwicK, PoIMcAL VIoLENCE AND PUBuc ORDER (1969).
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interests.Y Indeed, one of the most common judicial techniques for dealing
with claims of free speech is to deny that the instant case has anything to
do with free speech at all.

In British law, political offenses such as sedition and incitement to
disaffection are defined in terms of bad tendency, rather than likelihood of
imminent serious harms.n The police have a large discretion (only cursorily
reviewed by courts) to choke off speakers or prevent meetings if they
"reasonably apprehend" breaches of the peace either from the speaker's
followers or his opponents, thus giving some legal encouragement to the
"heckler's veto." 27 Extra-parliamentary politics is always legally suspect:
Some cases go so far as to suggest that any political uses of the highway
other than marches or processions are abnormal and hence obstructive uses,

to be tolerated only until the police or adjoining owners object. 28 The
official attitude is well expressed in Lord Beloff's remarks in the debates

over the draconian new Public Order Act of 1986:29 that given universal
suffrage and many new representative bodies, we should not longer put
quite the accent that has been put on the tradition of assembly, the
tradition of marching, the tradition of open-air protest as though the
fact that those things were necessary in past ages is a guide to us
today. . . . [Rather,] the guaranteeing of the ability of the individual
citizen to pursue his lawful avocation, to move freely about the streets
of his city and to avoid interruption to the ordinary amenities of daily
life, is of infinitely greater importance than guaranteeing the right to
hold meetings in public places, to march in processions or perform any
of those other activities.10

Since 1968, as is of course well known, there has been a marked resurgence
of extra-parliamentary union politics-a departure from the traditional

25. Galligan, supra note 22, at 45-47, has a useful discussion of the "balancing" metaphor.
26. See R. v. Arrowsmith, [1974] 1 Q.B. 678 (incitement to disaffection); R. v. Aldred,
[1909] 22 Cox. Crim. C. 1; Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 56;
Note, Seditious Libel and the Press, 64 LAw Q. Rv. 203 (1948). Compare Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969):
([T]he principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.).
To be fair one must add that the common law offense of seditious libel, though never
statutorily repealed, is for practical purposes a dead letter in Britain.
27. See Jordan v. Burgoyne, [1963] 2 All E.R. 225 (Q.B.); Duncan v. Jones, [1936] 1 K.B.
218. Contrast what appear to be the dominant American views on the heckler's veto in Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). But see
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
28. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Pitt, [1976] 1 Q.B. 142; Hunt v. Broome, [1973] 1 Q.B. 691.
29. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64.
Processions,Assemblies, and the Freedom
30. Williams, The PublicOrderAct 1986: Part1I:
of the Individual, 1987 CaUM. L. REv. (English) 167, 168 (quoting Beloff). The Thatcher
Government's official rationale for the new law is set out in its Wma PAPER, REVIEw OF
PUaLc ORDER LAW, 1985, CNm. No. 9510.
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British labor pattern of separating political from economic action and leaving
the former to its Labour Party representatives-and a corresponding drive
since 1971 to circumscribe labor politics both through restrictive labor law
and strenuous enforcement of the general public order law. Very summarily,
the object of regulation is to confine legitimate strikes and picketing to
small numbers of demonstrators at their own employer's workplace, to
forbid most forms of secondary and sympathetic action and political strikes,
to provide members with liberal exit options from both closed shops and
the levies that raise political funds, and to restore the pre-1906 Trade
Disputes Act" regime of regulation by injunction and contempt fines against
organizers who transgress these restrictions.3 2 The legal techniques the government deployed against the great Miners' Strike of 1984-85 were in some
ways quite astonishing. The basic strategy was to de-legitimate the strikers
(who were, in any case, not able to command majority public support for
their goals even among other union members) by portraying them as simple
lawbreakers, breachers of the peace. To that end, the police and the courts
applying the preventive and criminal law of public order simply appropriated
the criteria for permissible expressive activity from the labor law's specification of the limited range of activity given statutory immunity from civil
tort liability-thus in a stroke converting torts into criminal acts of unlawful
assembly, breach of the peace, unreasonable use of the highway,3" or
obstruction of constables in the execution of their duty.3 4 So, for example,
caravans of sympathy pickets travelling to Nottinghamshire were held up
by police roadblocks-over 160,000 of such pickets were turned away-and
arrested if they refused to turn around," and this action was later sustained
by the courts 36 on the ground that the police could reasonably believe from
reading newspapers that the travellers would probably later breach the peace
' 37
or engage in what the Public Order Act proscribes as "insulting behavior
towards strike-breaking miners. Arrested picketers were granted bail on the
express condition that they engage in no further picketing save in pickets
not exceeding six people at their own employer's workplace-a rather finely
tuned prior restraint !13 And after the strike the government passed the

31. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47. This Act in effect entirely removed a
wide range of labor-capital struggles and bargaining tactics from legal regulation altogether.
32. For a summary, see K. WEDDERDuRN, THE WORKER AND Tm LAw (3d ed. 1986).

33. See Thomas v. National Union of Mineworkers, The Times (London), Feb. 18, 1985,
at 6, col. I (Ch.).
34. See P. KAHN, PICKETING: INDusTRiAL DispuTEs, TAcTics, AND Tm LAW (1983); POLICING
(B. Fine & R. Millar eds. 1985); Wallington, Policing the Miners' Strike,
THE MINERs' STnu
14 INDus. L.J. 145 (1985).

35.
36.
Ct.).
37.
38.

Wallington, supra note 34, at 154.
Moss v. McLachlan, The Times (London), Nov. 29, 1984, at 25, col. 6 (Q.B. Div'l
Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6, § 5.
See R. v. Mansfield Justices ex parte Sharkey, [19851 1 All E.R. 193 (Q.B.).
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remarkable new comprehensive Public Order Act of 1986, which supplements

the impressive existing array of common law and statutory police powers
with additional ones to ban and to impose advance conditions on street
politics and picketing and to arrest demonstrators for the bad tendencies
their behavior may provoke in others 9-a statute most provisions of which
an American constitutional court would, I believe, have very little hesitation
in declaring to be obviously invalid on their face as delegating far too much
discretion to local authorities and the police to select the causes that may
have access to public fora, and to impose upon them prior restraints.4
One could, as I say, multiply examples from every corner of British lawcontempt of court, where the judges have tried strenuously to clamp down
on press discussion of issues raised by pending litigation 4' (again, you notice,
discussion of matters of public interest outside official channels); the at42
tempts, bordering recently on the farcical in the Spycatcher proceedings,
to preserve the government's monopoly of public information through the
common law breach of confidence and the Official Secrets Act 43 and to

censor or enjoin television programs challenging government views; 44 the
strong resurgence of cultural conservativism among influential Ministers and
MPs, reflected in, among many other places, the outraged resistance to
implementing the libertarian Williams Committee's proposal to decriminalize

pornography 45 and repeal the old definition, re-encased in statute in 1959,
of the obscene as that which tends "to deprave and corrupt"; 46 in a

prosecution as recent as 1977 for the common law offense of blasphemy,
brought against Gay News for portraying Christ as a homosexual; 47 and in

39. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64. For analysis, see The Public Order Act 1986, 1987
Cgim. L. Rav. 153.
40. See sources cited infra note 65.
41. See, e.g., A.G. v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1974 A.C. 273 (H.L.) (House of Lords
upheld injunction and contempt fine against Sunday Times for reports on disputes with
thalidomide plaintiffs against Distillers, Co.), disapproved in The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 245. Compare the relatively libertarian U.S. regime
promoted in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
42. A.G. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1988] 3 All E.R. 545 (Ch. Div., C.A.,
H.L.); A.G. v. Observer Ltd., [1988] 1 All E.R. 385 (Ch. Div.); A.G. v. Guardian Newspapers
Ltd., [1987] 3 All E.R. 316 (Ch. Div., C.A., H.L.).
43. Official Secrets Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 75. See I. BROWNLIE & M. SUrpEmsroNE,
supra note 1; E. BtaRNDT, supra note 1, at 167-72. For accounts of recent developments, see
Jenkins, Not-so Free Speech in Britain, 35 N.Y. REv. BKS. 17 (1988); Atlas, Thatcher Puts a
Lid On: Censorship in Britain, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
44. Atlas, supra note 43.
45. For the story of the Williams Committee, which proposed decriminalizing and zoning
most forms of pornography, and the fate of its recommendations, see A. SiMPSON, PORNOOAnPY AND PoLrrcs (1983).
46. The classic test is in R. v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360; codified in Obscene Publications
Act, 1959, ch. 66, § 1.
47. R. v. Lemon, [1979] 1 Q.B. 10.
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a 1988 amendment to the Local Government Act forbidding local authorities
to spend funds to "promote homosexuality."' '
It is tempting to suggest that such contrasts as these lie in deeply rooted
differences in political culture:49 English culture is more homogeneous,
American more pluralist because it is a nation of immigrants, which England
has only very recently begun to become; English politics is dominated by
Oxbridge gentlemen and is thus far more polite and rationalistic than the
politics of a raw frontier society; the English are more disposed to trust
and to give large discretion to governmental authorities than Americans,
who historically have circumscribed governmental power both democratically
through "the People out of doors" asserting the legal legitimacy to correct,
if necessary by revolution, the abuses of established powers, and judicially,
through review by constitutional courts, whose constitution fragments, divides, and decentralizes governmental power, and whose electorate left polite
deference politics behind for good after the Federalist defeat of 1800. There
is obviously something to these broad contrasts, but they are in fact much
too broad. The fact is that both ideological visions, the conservative and
the revisionary, have been fully present in the historical cultures of both
societies. Which elements tend to predominate really has depended much
more on quite contingent patterns and events than upon consistent or
inherent structural differences.
For one thing, U.S. law is closer to British in many respects than my
initial contrast suggested. With regard to picketing and trade union street
politics, the regimes are in many respects quite similar, notwithstanding the
ringing declaration in the Thornhill case of 1940 that peaceful picketing is
a first amendment right, a form of "free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes . . . indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape
the destiny of modern industrial society, ' 50 a formulation all the more
strikingly revisionary when compared to the British common lawyers' treatment of nearly all labor actions as barely legitimate, to be tolerated only
by virtue of narrowly construed statutory "immunities" from tort liability.
For as a practical matter in the U.S. as well, the immunities are narrow,

48. Local Government Act, 1988, ch. 9, § 28:
(1) A local government shall not(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of
promoting homosexuality;
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.
Compare (not this time, alas, to the credit of the U.S.), the Reagan Administration's "gagrule" regulations on family planning counseling, 42 C.F.R. § 59 (prohibiting federally funded
family planning clinics from counselling, or referring patients to clinics that perform abortions).
49. For such suggestions, see, e.g., Barnum, supra note 1.
50. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
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and mostly confined to the context of economic disputes with a primary
employer. The legal regime discourages building cross-workplace alliances
through secondary action5 and strongly discourages industrial action pursuing political aims. 2 It gives owners/employers/managers a large discretion
to restrict political activity in and about the workplace, to use the threats
of dismissal and discipline to control such workplace politics53 as is not
specifically protected by labor law (which in any case covers only fifteen
percent of the workforce), and to veto entirely demonstrations in open fora
5
that are formally "private property," such as shopping malls.

4

In matters of sexual regulation the systems also tend somewhat to converge, both at the (increasingly purely symbolic level) of the formal law,
and in practice. Faced with obscenity, first amendment law loses much of
the self-restraint it feels towards political speech, is willing to criminalize
bad tendencies and speculative harms without proof of imminent and serious
clear and present danger, and without feeling such proof is required. 5 With

51. See, e.g., Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4); R.
GoumAN, LABOR LAW ch. 12 (1976).
52. Discouragement of political strikes was the stated purpose of the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982).
53. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212 (1982)
(secondary picketing of longshoremen protesting Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not protected
by first amendment); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union (SAFECO case), 447 U.S. 607
(1980) (secondary consumer pickets that threaten neutral parties with economic loss not
protected by first amendment). After such cases very little remains of the Thornhill doctrine
on pickets. See Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited
Expression, 43 MD. L. Ray. 4 (1984); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free
Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982); Note, Peaceful
Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 CoLum. L. Ray. 1469 (1982). But, for a
surprising Red island in this sea of Blue, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982) (picketing by civil rights groups in support of boycott of racially discriminating
white merchants protected by the first amendment). It may appear that such cases as Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979) and Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), grant broad constitutional protection from dismissal or
discipline to politically active public employees. But the protection extends only to employee
speech on "public issues," which do not include workplace conditions, and disappears upon
a showing that such activism may threaten internal discipline. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983). The doctrine thus functions to preserve the conservative division between the public
sphere, where politics is appropriate, and the workplace, where political freedom must be
contained within straitly regulated limits to avoid damage to owners' property and employers'
order. On the strong bias in U.S. labor law in favor of order defined as employee subordination

and (non-reciprocated) loyalty, see J.
LAW 84-107 (1983).

ATLESON, VALuS AND ASSUMPTION IN AMERICAN LABOR

54. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
55. See Paris Adult Theatres I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60, 63 (1973):
(But, it is argued, there are no scientific data which conclusively demonstrate
that exposure to obscene material adversely affects men and women or their
society. . . . The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades,
affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship
of human existence, central fo family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial
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respect to deviant sexual practices, many American states remain more
legally conservative than the British, who long ago decriminalized private

sex between consenting homosexuals.5 6 Yet at the level of actual enforcement
of sexual regulations, both societies have largely given up, at least for the
present, on purity crusades, save for zoning regulation of public displays
of explicit sex, raids on child pornographers and mass distribution networks
of hard core pornography, and the occasional symbolic prosecution.5 7 The

great Blue sex law cases of the century between 1850 and 1950, the
spectacular occasions for affirming public morals through prosecutions of
notorious literary works from Madame Bovary to Lady Chatterley's Lover,
have disappeared altogether." Even then-Attorney General Meese's recent
Commission on Pornography, dominated though it was by cultural conservatives, recommended that henceforth the printed word be exempted from
prosecution.

59

More importantly, to the extent American free speech law does favor the
revisionary side, that law is of relatively recent origin, and responsive to
different configurations of social threats. The first comprehensive British
Public Order Act, enacted in 1936, 60 was immediately directed to the
suppression of the marches of the British Union of Fascists through London's East End in what turned out to be fortunately pathetic imitations of
Mussolini's paramilitary demonstrators and was more obliquely intended to
respond to waves of strike activity, led as usual by the miners. 61 The new
Act of 198662 is also a response-by a government ideologically committed
to shattering the unions' postwar share in sovereignty-to resurgent political
strikes, as well as to the London and Liverpool race riots of 1981 and
hooligan violence at football games. 63 In the U.S., on the other hand, much
of the governing public forum doctrine, as well as the law of political libel, 64
emerges from the context of a civil rights movement for whose cause, by

exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching
such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no
conclusive evidence or empirical data.) (Burger, C.J.).
56. Compare Sexual Offences Act, 1967, ch. 60 with GA. CODE ANN. 16-6-2(a) (1984), the
constitutionality of which was recently upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
57. Project, An EmpriricalInquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control
of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 810 (1977).
58. For excellent histories of these prosecutions, see W. IENDRiCK, TBE SECaEr MusaUr:
PORNOGRAPHY iN MoDERN CULTRaE (1987); N. ST. JoHN-STEvAs, OBsCENITY AND THE LAW
(1956).
59. Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, 1 Final Report 383 (1986), cited in
W. KENDicK, supra note 58, at 235.

60. Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & I Geo. 6.
61. On background to the 1936 Act, see THE CROWD 3N
note 5; D. WmwLss, K.EPINo THE PEACE (1967).
62. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64.
63. See R. CARD, PUBLIC ORDER: THE NEW LAW (1987).
64. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the time the cases were decided, federal authorities were inclined to feel
some sympathy and were therefore receptive to striking down the arsenal
of public-order statutes-breaching the peace, obstructing the highway,
inciting to riot, obstructing the police, unlawful assembly and all the restas giving too much authority to state and local officials and police. 65
Still more important: The counter-images to the prevailing ones-the Dark
Side of the Force if you like-are always available in both cultures as
alternative sources of tradition. England had its full share of the rich
varieties of European popular protest: "The anti-tax rebellion, the movement
against conscription, the food riot, the concerted invasion of fields or forests
. . . [and the peaceful collective action of groups,] brought forth declarations, demands, petitions, or lawsuits; or . . . festivals and ceremonies in
the course of which ordinary people expressed their grievances symbolically." 66 Americans, in fact, learned the techniques of popular protest from
the English. 67 In political debate over public-order issues, this tradition is
frequently invoked in Britain. A wonderful example is the very conservative
Sir John Simon, in the debate over the 1936 Public Order Act, responding
to a proposal to ban demonstrations altogether:
I think that demonstrations by way of procession are an old and wellestablished method of exhibiting a point of view . . . . I remember

65. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). These are by no means unambiguously
"revisionary" cases: The Cox decision in particular is suffused with the Blue rhetoric of "mob
rule." Harry Kalven commented on the
extraordinary ambivalence of the Court's reaction [in Cox]. As the parade leaves
the State House grounds and moves down toward the courthouse, it changes
from an attractive group of concerned citizens using democratic avenues of
protest on public issues to a mob, heavy with the promise of anarchy, seeking
to dominate.
Kalven, The Concept of the PublicForum, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 9. Indeed, American publicorder law generally is constantly torn between its Blue disposition to privilege the demands of
order, efficiency, hierarchy, quiet and the routine business of life over expressive uses of public
spaces, sometimes hinting that controllers of such spaces may exclude such uses altogether so
long as they do not discriminate among viewpoints and its Red attachment to a privileged
place for demonstrations in public fora, given classic voice in Justice Roberts' dictum:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens.
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). For a thorough and still useful analysis of this
schizophrenia, see Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233.
66. Tilly, Charivaris,Repertoiresand Urban Politics, in FRENC CrrEs IN THE NDM-TEE14TH
CErrURY 73, 76 (J. Merriman ebl. 1981). There is now an enormous literature on English
popular protest. See, e.g., G. RUDE, WiLycs
DisrtaANczs IN ENGLAND,

supra note 5.
67. See P.

MAIER,

AND

LmIairv (1961); J. STaENsoN, PoPULAR

1700-1870 (1979); Dunning, Mfirphy, Newburn & Waddington,

supra note 16.
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how in the old Home Rule days the most respectable and authoritative
persons joined in processions to demonstrate against the Home Rule
Bill in various parts of the country.68

And the strength of this counter-tradition has resulted in a regime far
more permissive than its vast formal powers suggest. Demonstrations are
actually frequent, and in "normal times" protected by the police:69 The
total suppression of popular protest is not on anyone's agenda, though

protecting the legal capacity for total suppression is. It is much like the
situation depicted in Douglas Hay's classic account of eighteenth century
English criminal law: The state manifests its self-restraint, and thus increases
its legitimacy, by using its terrifying legal powers sparingly.7" As 1984-85
showed, however, one cannot always count on the state to refrain from

71
using them.
In any case, there is a much more significant indicator of commitment
to revisionary practices than tolerance for demonstrations. That is, whether
alternative visions of social and economic life are able to make their way
onto the mainstream political agenda. Do they have spokesmen among the
"responsible" elite leadership; are they treated seriously by the mass media,
debated in schools, unions, corporate boards and business policy groups,
administrative agencies, town councils and legislatures; do they give a
standpoint for informed and vigorous criticisms of current government

policy; do they generate practical proposals for action? By that standard,

British politics is in some ways72 far more vital than ours: A wide segment
of left-of-center spectrum of ideas and policy proposals, an alternative not
embarrassed to call itself "Socialist"-which simply disappeared from mainstream politics in the U.S. after the Popular Front, banished to tiny

68. Quoted in D. WniAms, supra note 61, at 56-57.
69. In 1972, 1973 and 1974, according to police sources, there were 1,321 political
demonstrations in London alone. See Report of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis
1974, app. 8, quoted in S. BAnLY, D. HAmus & D. JoaNs, CIVI LiERTrms: CAsEs

AND

121 (1985).
70. Hay, Property, Authority and the CriminalLaw, in ALIoN's

MATERus

SocirY

iN

ElGrEE

FATAL TREE: Camm AND
H-CENTuRy ENGLAND 17 (D. Hay, J. Rule, P. Linebaugh, E.P. Thompson

& C. Winslow eds. 1975).
71. The British police brought a total of 11,312 charges during the strike: 646 for riot and
unlawful assembly, 275 for "watching and besetting" premises, 4,107 for conduct likely to
cause a breach of the peace, 1,682 for obstructing a constable, 640 for obstructing the highway,
The object was-in addition of course to preventing violence-to break the strike, not to
punish the miners, and certainly not to create new martyrs for the labor movement: Accordingly,
most of these charges were later dismissed or punished with light fines. See K. WEDDERBuRN,
supra note 32, at 549.
72. Though only in some ways. It is certainly plausible that American associations below
the level of the state have been more open to organizational innovation, including experiments
with limited forms of economic democracy, than their British counterparts. For a brief summary
of the stagnation of both management and labor practices in British industry, see P. HALL,
GovERNiN' THE EcoNomy: Tan Pouncs oF STATE INTERVENTION IN Barrsu AND FRANCE 4245 (1986).
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conclaves in the universities and small magazines-is still a force in British
political and intellectual opinion, though one, as elsewhere in the world, in
some stagnation and disarray. (Whether the range of policies capable of
actually being implemented is really very much broader there than here is
another question, to which the history of successive Labour Governments
suggests a skeptical answer.)
Looking now to the American side of the contrast: American civic culture
has experienced prolonged periods of the imposition of a strenuously conservative ideology of order. The Red Scares of 1917-20 now appear as an
intensified culmination of a long period in which a dominant middle class
that was able, as Mrs. Thatcher's government is now, to exclude effective
political alternatives," attempted to impose a regime of extraordinary conformity on political culture, making extensive use of legal means, both
promotional and coercive, to do so: the enactment of laws against sedition,
syndicalism, and criminal anarchy; mass deportation of aliens; deployment
of federal troops against strikers; mass prosecutions under incitement-todisaffection and sedition statutes of workers' associations that opposed the
World War I war effort as a "capitalists' war"; compulsory education in
Americanism in schools; purity crusades resulting in legislation and official
and unofficial censorship authority to stamp out alcohol, prostitution and
obscenity; and severe legal crackdowns on abortion and advocates of birth
control. 74 The emergence of a major left-wing political alternative was
forestalled through the electoral co-optation and defeat of Populism in
1896, 71 and a long series of ferociously brutal measures designed to eradicate
the left-wing unions such as the I.W.W. 76 Judges of the period were inclined
to treat almost all forms of picketing, however peaceful, as unacceptably
disruptive disorder. 77 British judges of the same period were certainly just
as hostile as American judges to labor unions, holding (in the teeth of

73. See W.D. BmuRis, Tm CUiRRNT CISis IN AMRcAN Po-ncs (1982).
74. On this period, see especially P. BOYER, PusRY IN PRINT (1968); J. D'Emuo & E.
FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MArrEps: A HISTORY OF SExuA=Y IN AmRICA (1988); R. GoLDsmIN,
POLTCAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA (1978); D. KENNEDY, BmTH CONTROL IN AMERICA
(1970); J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978); P. MuRpHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN
OF Crvrm LIBERTIES IN TI UNITED STATES (1979); MURRAY, RED ScARE (1955); D. PrvAR,
Pr TY CRUSADE (1973); W. PR.sTON, ALIENS AND DIssENTERs (1963); Rabban, The Emergence
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 1205 (1983); Rabban, The First
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
75. See L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULiST MovEETrr IN AMERucA (1976).
76. See M. DuEOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF
THE WORLD (2d ed. 1988); P. FONER, 4 HISTORY OF mi LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: Tm INDusTnms. WORKERS OF Tim WORLD, 1905-1917 (1962); R. GOLDsmIN, supra
note 74.
77. See Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Cover, The Left, the Right, and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REv. 349 (1981);
Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HAEV. L. REv. 1111, 1165-79
(1989).
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statutes plainly designed to accomplish contrary results) that even peaceful

picketing to persuade others to withhold their labor was enjoinable as
criminal activity, 7 and that union expenditures on political activities were
illegal as beyond their permissible functions, 79 a decision striking at the
roots of Labour's parliamentary base. But British unions had already won
enough political clout to have these decisions qualified or reversed.80 In the
U.S., labor's gains at the state legislative level could be, and often were,
nullified on constitutional grounds by hostile judges.8'
In the U.S., it was surely the Depression, with its fatal undermining of
the legitimacy of the dominant political culture's claims to have found the
uniquely necessary constitution of freedom and prosperity (and perhaps
above all the legitimation of labor-organizing activity in the Wagner Act),
that made possible the libertarian turn in first amendment doctrine in
Herndon v. Lowry, 2 Hague v. CIO,"3 DeJonge v. Oregon,84 Near v.
Minnesota,8" Stromberg v. California,8 6 Cantwell v. Connecticut,7 and
Thornhill v. Alabama8 -the cases of the 1930's and 1940's that are among
the doctrinal foundations of America's currently relatively libertarian publicorder and subversive-advocacy law. 9 Yet that turn was of course reversed,
with a vengeance, in the reversion to "bad tendency" doctrines of harm in
the Smith Act and Subversive Activities Control Act cases, the loyaltysecurity purges and investigations of the 1950's, 90 and the attempt through

78. J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins, [1896] 1 Ch. 811.
79. Osborne v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1909] 1 Ch. 163, aff'd, [1910] A.C.
87 (H.L.).
80. For the hostile dialogue between Parliament and the judges in the early part of the
century, see generally H. PmLPs-BRowN, Omonis op TRADE UNioN PowER 32-71 (1983); M.
Klarman, The Judges Versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor Law, 1867-1913
(draft 6 Nov. 9, 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
81. Forbath, supra note 77, at 123748.
82. 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (striking down state statute proscribing "incitement insurrection"
as too vague to give speakers and juries notice of prohibited conduct).
83. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (invalidating standardiess municipal ordinance requiring permits
for public assemblies).
84. 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (holding unconstitutional state criminal syndicalism statute as
applied to convict Communist Party member for participating in peaceful Party assembly).
85. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (prohibiting prior restraints on press publication in all but
"exceptional cases").
86. 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (invalidating, as too vague and indefinite, state statute making
criminal felony the display of a red flag as a "symbol . . . of opposition to organized
government").
87. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing breach-of-peace conviction of Jehovah's Witness for
public attack on Catholicism, on grounds that wide tolerance must be given to sharp expressions
of differing views on political and religious matters).
88. 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (according first amendment protection to peaceful picketing as a
form of political communication).
89. See H. KALvar, A WoRTny TRAIDMON 167-78 (1988).
90. The flood of Blue doctrine in this period is beautifully analyzed id. at 179-210, 264339.
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the Taft-Hartley Act to circumscribe organized labor's political influence. 9'
Modern British politics has had its own hysterical and xenophobic episodes,
leading at their worst to mass wartime internments of aliens, refugees, and
even loyal subjects on the scantiest grounds and without due process, 92 as
well as frequent deployments of police and military forces to put down

strikes. 93 But modern Britain (the early nineteenth century is another story)
has never experienced such wholesale frenzied turning on radical opinion as

occurred in our Red Scares. Even in the area that still provides the most
dramatic distinctions between ideologies of order in Britain and America,
that of legal protection for government secrets and limits on access to

government information, recent American administrations have been moving
rapidly toward
imitation of the British fetish for confidentiality and closed
94
government.

So far we have simply been fuzzying up the identification of Blue doctrine
with the British, and Red with the American, shores of the Atlantic. But
the Blue-Red dichotomy itself begins to dissolve when pressed too far.
Consider, for example, that some aspects of what I have been calling
revisionary ideologies are quite often the instruments of a very conservative

politics. I mean conservative here in two distinct senses.
One sense is simply that expressed in the safety-valve theory of free
speech-that a wide latitude given to extra-Parliamentary politics, including
both street politics and a strong institutional role in the polity, economy,

and culture for intermediate associations-is in fact the most reliable instrumental means to stable political and social order. The U.S. was, after
all, the country that discovered, as Tocqueville among others pointed out,
that you did not need a state religion as a bulwark to piety, morality, and

conventional stability. The same benefits of social control could be achieved
even more efficiently through allowing a plurality of churches and other
stabilizing mechanisms, especially the devitalizing of public life that occurs
when citizens withdraw from it into the private pursuit of profit. 95 Norman

91. See Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 152 (1961);
Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 148 (1974) (analyzing limits on union
political speech).
92. P. GILLMAN & L. GiLMAN, COLLAR Tim LOT! (1980); A.W.B. Simpson, Rhetoric,
Reality and Regulation 18B (Child & Co. Oxford Lecture, May 12, 1987).
93. See R. GEARY, POLICIN INrusTRIAL DIsPTms: 1893 TO 1985 (1985); S. PEAK, TROOPS
IN STRIKEs (1984).
94. For summary accounts of these differences, see E. BARENDT, supra note 1; I. BROWNE
& M. STJPPERSTONE, supra note 1; for recent U.S. developments, see Edgar & Schmidt, Curtiss-

Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
REv. 349 (1986); Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 409 (1986).
95. See A. DE TOCQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835). See also modem writers on
the same theme, e.g., J. DEWEY, Tan PUBLIC AN) ITS PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1954); R. SENNErr,
THE DECLINE OF PUBLIC MAN (1978).
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Rosenberg has pointed out in his illuminating history of political libel that
nineteenth century spokesmen for a wide legal freedom for public expression
believed that dangerous ideas were better ventilated than left to fester among
secret conspirators, and believed it because of their complete and largely
justified confidence that excessively revisionary ideas would be filtered out
by the associations controlling access to effective political speech. In other
words, it was perfectly safe to have uninhibited political debate because the
political parties and the press they controlled so effectively limited the range
of acceptable practical politics. When, later in the century, mass politics
began throwing up serious alternatives outside the regular channels, political
96
libel law was revived.
In some periods conservatives may support various kinds of corporatism,
expecting that legally institutionalized licensing of certain associations will
co-opt potentially competing sovereigns and enlist their help in securing
social stability-as when labor unions administer work discipline and antiinflationary regimes of wage restraint, deliver social benefits, and neutralize
class conflict over distributional shares (the system that more or less worked
in post-war Britain and the U.S. until the late 1960's).9 Or they may pursue
revisionary tactics as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy. One can never
tell without the closest attention to context whether laws promoting internal
union democracy are meant to empbwer insurgent innovators to challenge
corrupt and ossified union oligarchies, or simply to dilute the effective
power of the group itself to pursue revisionary politics.
Safety-valve theory may take the rather cynical form that Wolff and
Marcuse labelled "repressive tolerance"-i.e., that an official policy of
tolerance for plural forms of speech actually confirms the hegemony of
dominant speakers by seeming to permit all forms of dissent, and thereby
helps to render dissent ineffectual. 98 The evident fact that every group gets
to speak obscures the more important truth that only some get to speak
effectively. A pluralist polity doles out to every group its own little enclave,

96. N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 145-52 (1986).
97. See Cameron, Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society, in ORDER AN CONFLICT IN
CoNm MPoRARY CAPiTAL s M 143 (J. Goldthorpe ed. 1984); Crouch, The Intensification of
Industrial Conflict in the United Kingdom, in 1 THE RESURGENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN
WESTEmR EUROPE SINCE 1968 191 (C. Crouch & A. Pizzorno eds. 1978); Goldthorpe, Problems
of PoliticalEconomy after the Postwar Period, in CHANGING BoUNDARIEs oF THE POLITICAL
363, 385-97 (C. Maier ed. 1987); Maier, The Politicsof Productivity, in IN SEARCH OF STABHrY
121 (1987). As these sources make clear, however, one cannot automatically and a priori
characterize the corporatist arrangements of post-war Western societies as conservative simply
because they helped lead to some degree of stability in economic warfare. The important
question is whether labor groups were able to expand their political capacity (in and beyond
the workplace) in exchange for their cooperation, or whether they simply surrendered the
prospect of political capacity for a bigger share of the pie.
98. Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in A C~rIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 3 (R. Wolff ed. 1965).
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wherein its rites may be safely practiced without outside interference, but
also without influence on the background conditions of the social order.
Similarly, some conservatives have also discovered (although this remains a
subject of bitter dispute within conservative factions") that political stability
and the capitalist economic order-at least since the shift toward a massconsumption centered economy in the 1920's-may not, after all, depend
upon "virtue" in the sense of restraints upon sexuality and hedonistic selfindulgence. It may be that a regime of laissez-faire hedonism is a much
more effective device for passivizing and channeling dangerous political
instincts than ever was the classical regime of cultural control. The "otherdirected" consumers of the present, absorbed in their pursuit of private
gratifications and the economic means to satisfy them, no longer seem to
require the tightly regulated sexual constitution of the "inner-directed"
Victorian citizen, investor and producer. 0 Thus, the promotion of pluralism
in group and individual "lifestyles" may not, after all, produce any rival
sovereigns, but may simply shrink the size of the public sphere, wherein
the "common good" can be debated and revised. Politics is reduced entirely
to factional competition and log-rolling: Each group raises its voice in public
debate simply to increase its distributional share, but not to challenge or
revise prevailing notions of the common good, the general structures of the
polity, and the economy.' 0
Moreover, what at first looks like revisionary ideology has often been
conservative in another, more profound sense-directed to the restoration
of order, often very traditional forms of order indeed, in opposition to
forms of order that parade under the "conservative" banner. Of course,
the basic paradox of liberal-capitalist order is that it is by nature extremely
disorderly and destabilizing. As Marc Raeff has put it in his studies of the
origins of the "well-ordered police state," the resources of law in the
modern state are deployed to try to recreate the conditions of communal
1 -and continue to
solidarity that the state's own policies have disrupted°2
disrupt as craft workers are displaced by scientific managers administering

99. Compare S. BrrTAN, supra note 6, (libertarian) with G.F. GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE
(1973); R. KLArcH, WOMEN OF TnE Nrw RirHT (1987) (describing split between libertarians
and social conservatives).
100. See J. D'EMmIo &.E. FREEDAN, supra note 74; Grey, Eros, Civilization and the
Burger Court, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1980). Lately, however, some neoconservative writers have begun to question whether Sensual-Consumer Man is so socially
functional after all, whether the hedonistic cultures fostered by capitalist economies may not
threaten those economies' successful functioning. D. BELL, Tirm CUTvuaAL CoNRArcnToNs OF
CAPITALIsM

(1976).

101. See Wolff, supra note 98, at 48-52. This is the set of concerns of the current revival

of interest in the "republican" tradition of civic deliberation and participation.
102. See Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europe: An Attempt at a ComparativeApproach, 80 Am.
HIST. REv. 1221 (1975).
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new technologies, plants close that have been the life of whole cities, mobility
and unemployment strain family relations to the breaking point, hedonistic
cultures of consumption erode traditional sexual commitments, and traditional hierarchies lose their ability to command respect and obedience. In
the face of such disruption, the legal strategies of both coiservative and
revisionary parties,
as I have been calling them, are to refashion forms of
"moral economy '1 03 in response to a process of continuous disintegration.
Over and over in the history of capitalism, the sources of the discontent
that lead to organized protest are to be found in groups that cherish, and
fear the breakup of, traditional ideas of work, craft tradition, honor,
solidarity and community-guild brotherhoods, artisan producers' cooperatives, mining villages, tenant farmers associations, and the like.' 04 The
people calling upon the legal system to protect entrepreneurial property
rights against labor or state infringement are concerned to defend, not
social stability, but the right to incessant destruction of stable production
methods, workplace relations, and community ties. In describing such
movements, any hope of useful distinction among ideas of order by calling
them "conservative" and "radical"completely disappears.105
Take-as another set of examples, this time drawn from conflicting
ideologies of sexual order-the "purity" and moral-order and politicalreform crusades of the late nineteenth century. The slogan of the Purity
Leagues was, "No sex in business, no sex in politics"-in other words,
everything in its proper sphere, sex only in the family, where it belongs, no
sexual exploitation of working women, no commercialization of sex into
prostitution. But these irreproachably respectable concerns led many of the
purity reformers rapidly towards a very radical politics indeed, one that
made use of collective organization to challenge the basis of patriarchy
itself-the social and sexual domination of women by men and the male
monopoly of politics-and exploded into a challenge to the legal system
and the system of production that facilitated that domination, and finally

103. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd, 50 PAST AND PRESENT 76

(1971).
104. Such, overwhelmingly, are the conclusions of the new labor histories that have been
replacing prior accounts of the gradual evolutionary development of socialism and tradeunionism among working classes. For a sampling of this now enormous literature, see H.
GurrmAN, WoRK, CUtmURE & AUTHoRITY IN INDUsTR ALIzING AMERICA (1975); S. HAHN, Tan
RooTs OF SOUTHERN PoPuusM (1983); D. MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR
171-213 (1987); B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: Tim SocIAL SoURcEs oF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT (1978);
W. REDDY, MONEY AND LIBERTY IN MODERN EUROPE 208-13 (1987); Thompson, Time, WorkDiscipline, and IndustrialCapitalism, 38 PAST AND PRESENT 56 (1967). To make this point is

not at all to deny that groups moved to revolt by a "conservative" initial impulse to protect
their traditional order often come in time to adopt a radically revisionary politics.
105. For a careful exposition of this point, showing how extraordinarily contingent the
political choices craftsmen have made between protecting traditional privileges and allying with
other groups in a transformative politics, and how quickly each set of choices can turn into
the other, see C. SABEL, WORK AND POLmCS 167-93 (1982).
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to the core premise of the market system, the assimilation of everything
desirable to a commercial commodity.106 On the other hand, the "free love"
movements, which at first glance would seem to represent the claims of an
unbridled revisionary sexual spontaneity against those of repressive order,
turn out on closer inspection to be attempts to establish an order of equal,
companionate, faithful relations between men and women. "Free love"
aimed to realize the professed liberal ideals of equality and individual
freedom by proposing an alternative social form to marriage, which was
seen as an anti-liberal, legally licensed regime of arbitrary authoritarian
7
rule, violence, rape, financial dependence, and involuntary motherhood.2
There are comparable difficulties in sorting out the politics of the antipornography crusades that have created such unlikely alliances of cultural
conservatives and radical feminists. The conservative critique of pornography
is that it incites to sex in the wrong places; it is Eros dangerously unchanrpeled and unconfined and publicly flaunted, instead of safely locked up in
heterosexual-monogamous-marriage for the sake of procreation. The conservative is out to shore up the patriarchal family and the culture of
traditional virtue, not to subvert them. But he has been joined by feminists
with an entirely different agenda, for whom pornography is a paradigmatic
type of the millions of social practices that produce and reproduce patriarchy
and exploitation and rape, through representations reducing women to
creatures whose only function is to be sexually used and who find pleasure
and their true nature in submission to violent domination. Their fight
against pornography is a fight against the erotic constitution of traditional
society itself. 08
In many situations, it is the party with the apparently innocuous aim of
restoring the elementary bases of social order and the rule of law (just as
conservatives define these terms) that turns out to be the party of radical
visionaries. In the post-Civil War South, for instance, enforcing the most
basic minimal contract, property, and personal-security rights of newly
emancipated blacks in the context of a local legal system tied to the interests
of white planters and an officially tolerated regime of extralegal terror in
the form of the Klan, would have required a continuing commitment of
massive Federal military force, which, not surprisingly, the political nation
was ultimately unwilling to make. 9 For in that context, maintenance of
the minimal conditions of liberal order against the terrorism and lynching
used as routine instruments of social control would have required total
transformation of the structure of political, economic, and social author-

106. See J. D'EmImo & E. FREEDMAN, supra note 74, at 150-67; D. PIVAR, supra note 74.
107. J. D'Em.iuo & E. FREEDMAN, supra note 74, at 150-67.

108. West, The Feminist-ConservativeAnti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney
General's Commission on PornographyReport, 1987 AM. BAR FouiN. REs. J. 681 (1987).
109. See generally E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTON (1988).

1989]

FREE EXPRESSION

ity."10 As Zechariah Chafee ironically remarked of the Southern officials
Who prosecuted Angelo Herndon (the black Communist Party organizer of
the 1930's) for sedition: "They were afraid, not that the United States
Constitution would be overthrown, but that it might be enforced.""'
There is yet a further paradox inherent in the neo-conservative project of
restoring the conditions of order-that is, the project of redefining the
boundaries of the political so that the basic terms of social life, family life,
relations between the sexes, relations in the workplace, the direction of the
economy-will be viewed as non-political and uncontestable, moved off the
agenda of permissible political debate and state action. Any attempt at the
actual instauration of such an order will require assertions of state power,
resources of legitimacy, mobilizations of the political faithful, that will
embroil the apostles of order still further in political dispute and debate.
Recall what happened in the last century when the South tried to remove
the slavery issue from normal political debate, as by preventing petitions
on the subject from being debated in the Congress, and legally silencing all
expressions of antislavery opinion in the South itself. 1 12 The effect was to
hand the abolitionist cause a powerful argument that all white middle-class
freedoms were in danger from the "slave conspiracy." The Red Scares of
the World War I period turned out to be the provoking cause for the origins
of the organized civil liberties movement. 3 In our own time, consider the
abortion issue, whigh both sides have hoped to move into the realm of the
uncontestable-the pro-life faction to treat it as ordinary crime, indisputably
murder, the pro-choice faction to entrench the right to abort constitutionally
against legislative revision. The actual effect of Roe v. Wade'1 4 was to move
abortion onto the national political agenda, in effect to create the pro-life
movement as a national force;11 5 just as the pro-life attempt to reverse Roe
and treat abortion as unproblematically criminal will in turn undoubtedly
mobilize fierce political resistance from the other side.
A related thought, and final paradox. Even for those such as myself who
are supporters, with some severe reservations, 1 6 of the revisionary ideal, it
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(1988) is a comprehensive history

of this horrifying tradition of terrorist violence as a technique of traditional order-maintenance.
111. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH N THE UNITED STATES 392 (1941).
112. R. NYE, FErERED FREEDOM: Cvm LIBERTIES AND TH SLAVERY CoNTRoVERSY, 1830-

1860 (2d ed. 1964).
113. See P. MURPHY, supra note 74.
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND TE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
116. The reservations would take a much longer essay, and not one chiefly devoted to
musing about categories as this one is, to deal with properly. Briefly though, the big problems
I have with revisionary ideology are these: First, it underestimates the strength and legitimacy
of human desires and needs for stability-for having some aspects and some periods of our
lives kept free from ceaseless political struggle and disruption. In their admirable concern that
people retain the means to remake the hierarchies that are continuously hardening around
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is hard to argue that the institutionalization of the ideal in law (to the
limited extent the Western democracies have in fact institutionalized it) has
realized more than the most modest hopes of its prophets. At its most
ambitious, the law of free expression should help to produce the type of
democratic politics that the revisionary ideal in its optimistic and aspirational
forms, as opposed to its cynical and co-optive forms, seeks to protect and
foster. There have been moments, among which in our own country's recent
history I would include the great industrial sit-down strikes of the 1930's,
the black civil rights movement of the 1960's, and the women's movements
of the last two decades, when such a politics has put in an appearance. But
for the most eloquently expressed and courageously acted upon modem
versions of the ideals of popular resistance and democratic participation,
one does not look so much to the relatively permissive Western democracies-where even the politics of suppressed or marginalized groups has
become a Babel of fragmented voices, each insisting upon its separate
cultural identity and experience of suffering and its separate interests, few
offering anything that looks like a transformative vision of social or
economic life-but rather to the dissident movements in such places as
China, South Africa and Eastern Europe. Genuine political innovation and
institutional creativity seem to flourish most, as our own history gloomily
confirms, in circumstances of a recently imposed repression; and almost
every single idea even of the conservative tradition itself, though conservatives do not always remember this, has been articulated in resistance to
such repression. I assume nobody is going to interpret this observation as
my making a plea for the imposition of tyranny in order to stimulate our
flagging appetites for revisionary politics. But perhaps it might stimulate us
to make more use for democratic purposes of the legal freedoms thatthough maybe only for the moment and subject to divestment at the next
historical turn-we appear to have.

them, revisionists are not always attentive to seeking, as the end of the struggle, peace (or at
least temporary truces). Second, it underestimates how much common socialiazation and
cooperation are required to create and maintain the communal conditions of public discourse
and action. The political demands and moral claims that groups wish to make upon one
another have to be mutually recognizable as legitimate and intelligible in terms of some shared
assumptions and ideals. And though the groups may strongly disagree about, and keep trying
to change, the constitution of the framework of rules and institutions (markets, legislatures,
legal systems, governing norms, discursive styles) that process and translate their claims, they
need some common commitment to maintain a functioning framework in some form. Otherwise
there will be no public sphere left within which to act, nothing left to fight over or revise.

